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I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to be secure in one’s own person is a natural, fundamental 
right.1  Many natural rights have been legally recognized, and legal 
mechanisms safeguard these rights by providing legal remedies to ensure 
that rights exist in a practical sense rather than as theoretical concepts.2 
Consider, for example, the right to procreate.3  In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
the Court strongly characterized sterilization as a permanent deprivation of 
an important human right.4  Almost sixty years later, in Robinson v. 
Cutchin, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
considered a case in which the plaintiff alleged that she was sterilized 
during a Cesarean section surgery without her consent.5  In a cavalier 
manner at odds with the grave tone of the Skinner court, the Robinson court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s case.6  The Robinson court held that because Mrs. 
Robinson suffered no more pain or injury than was normal following a 
Cesarean section, her unconsented sterilization was not harmful and her 
subsequent infertility was no injury.7  Furthermore, the court considered the 
dignity aspect of a battery action and found Mrs. Robinson’s injury 
lacking; in effect, the court substituted its “judgment” for Mrs. Robinson’s 
right to procreate.8  Because Maryland only recognizes informed consent 
violations as negligence causes of action, not battery, and Mrs. Robinson 
                                                          
 1. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (holding 
that the right to bodily integrity is a universal human right). 
 2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (creating a legal 
remedy is the legal mechanism to defend against and remedy an invasion of a right). 
 3. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (identifying procreation 
as a basic civil right of man because the ability to have children can have profound 
personal effects and determines the racial and social composition of future 
generations). 
 4. See id. at 541 (discussing the irreparable personal injury of sterilization and the 
insidious effects to society of the practice, particularly when used to conduct eugenics). 
 5. See Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490-91 (D. Md. 2001) (noting 
that although her consent to the Cesarean is undisputed, Mrs. Robinson did not consent 
to the tubal ligation procedure). 
 6. See id. at 493 (holding that Maryland does not recognize battery in informed 
consent cases and that Mrs. Robinson could not state a claim for negligence without 
suffering an injury). 
 7. See id. (noting that Mrs. Robinson did not even know she was infertile until 
twenty-one months after the surgery and that her only physical injury stemmed from 
the Cesarean to which she had consented). 
 8. See id. (explaining that since Mrs. Robinson had already born six children, she 
could not reasonably find sterilization offensive). 
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could not sustain negligence without a legally recognized injury, she was 
left without a cause of action or a legal remedy.9  Without a remedy to 
assert against Dr. Cutchin’s unconsented sterilization, Mrs. Robinson’s 
right to procreate was quantified at six children.10 
This Comment argues that the inadequacies of the informed consent 
doctrine fail to ensure the fundamental right to bodily integrity by 
analyzing pain management treatment during childbirth.  Part II will 
examine the modern doctrine of informed consent and how it evolved, 
inquire into other areas of law to identify analogous injuries to inadequate 
informed consent, and discuss why maternity care is an excellent lens 
through which to analyze informed consent.11  To demonstrate the 
limitations of informed consent law in America, this Comment analyzes the 
law through a hypothetical built on common maternity care practices and 
average patient experiences.12  Part III analyzes the hypothetical scenario 
under the informed consent statutes of the states of New York, Washington, 
and Wisconsin.13  Part IV discusses the policy implications of maintaining 
the status quo—which largely provides no legal remedy for the failure to 
obtain informed consent—and will recommend that states consider 
adopting informational standing to ensure the right to bodily integrity is not 
impinged.14  Part V concludes that as the modern doctrine of informed 
consent evolved, it has become disconnected from its original purpose and 
turned the fundamental right of bodily integrity into an illusory right.15 
                                                          
 9. See id. at 495 (dismissing Mrs. Robinson’s case because she lacked any legally 
recognized injury). 
 10. See id. at 491 n.1 (detailing Mrs. Robinson’s procreational history by 
specifically noting that she had three children with her husband and three prior children 
born out of wedlock). 
 11. See infra Part II (establishing the foundation for the analysis of informed 
consent for the management of labor pain). 
 12. See infra Part II (detailing each hypothetical assumption and the data that 
supports each assumption.  A hypothetical situation is used because, as this Comment 
will show, the injury requirement leaves many potential plaintiffs without a cause of 
action and has thus limited case law). 
 13. See infra Part III (analyzing these particular informed consent statutes because 
New York State uses the physician-centered standard, Washington State uses the 
patient-centered standard, and Wisconsin uses a hybrid approach that blends both 
standards). 
 14. See infra Part IV (recommending that informed consent statutes be amended to 
explicitly state that inadequate informed consent is a legally cognizable injury, and 
courts should apply the doctrine of informational standing to recognize the denial of 
information as a legally cognizable injury). 
 15. See infra Part V (concluding that informed consent no longer protects bodily 
integrity). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Evolution of Informed Consent 
Beginning with a string of cases in the early 1900s, courts began to 
recognize physician liability for medical battery when physicians acted 
without or exceeded the scope of a patient’s expressed or implied consent.16  
In 1957, California was the first state to articulate the modern informed 
consent doctrine as one of medical negligence rather than intentional tort.17  
Subsequently, most states codified or affirmed through case law the 
physician’s duty to require informed consent.18  The physician’s duty, as it 
evolved, was defined under one of two standards: (1) the reasonable care 
provider, or (2) the reasonable patient.19  While the standard will determine 
how much information is disclosed to the patient, there is general 
agreement that adequate informed consent disclosures include the purpose 
of the proposed treatment, its risks and benefits, available alternatives 
(including risks and benefits of alternative treatments), and the effect of no 
treatment.20  Once a patient is properly informed, it is the patient’s right to 
choose among the various alternatives rather than a physician’s right to 
prescribe the “best” treatment, even when that choice may be the more 
dangerous treatment.21 
When consent is inadequate rather than nonexistent, such as when a 
                                                          
 16. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Liability of Physician or Surgeon for Extending 
Operation or Treatment Beyond That Expressly Authorized, 56 A.L.R.2D 695, 704-05 
(1957) (detailing 19th century cases where physicians faced tort liability for battery or 
trespass after successful operations because the operations were unlawful infringement 
of patient’s right when there was no consent). 
 17. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1957) (classifying a physician’s decision to withhold material information as a 
breach of his duty rather than considering patient’s rights). 
 18. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972) (explaining that some 
states kept an action for battery in the common law because a treatment lacking any 
consent is a battery). 
 19. Compare Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E. 98, 103 (Ind. 1992) (explaining that 
the reasonably prudent physician standard measures disclosure by physician’s 
judgment because a physician is trained to be prudent but cannot be trained to 
anticipate what every patient would want to know), with Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10-12 
(articulating that the prudent patient standard measures disclosures by a patient’s 
judgment as a necessity for patient autonomy because otherwise all discretion is ceded 
to the physician). 
 20. E.g., Anna Karpman, Note & Comment, Informed Consent: Does the First 
Amendment Protect a Patient’s Right to Choose Alternative Treatment?, 16 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 933, 934 (2000) (describing the consensus of the general categories 
while noting the level of disclosure remains disputed). 
 21. See Bankert v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (D. Md. 1996) (holding 
that the competent patient’s right to select among medically acceptable treatments is 
absolute).  See generally Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(discussing that the right to control the course of one’s own treatment arises from the 
individual right to bodily integrity). 
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patient agrees to a specific procedure, but the physician does not tell the 
patient a procedure’s risks, or all the risks, the failure to obtain informed 
consent is generally categorized as negligence.22  Thus, for a cause of 
action, a plaintiff requires an injury proximately caused by the procedure 
that is causally connected with the inadequate consent.23  Under the 
negligence standard, a patient who received inadequate informed consent 
will be left with no legal remedy if the medical procedure did not result in a 
legally recognized injury because the negligence standard derives from the 
physician’s breach of a duty to the patient.24  This is contrary to its battery 
origins, which derive from the patient’s right to be secure in her person.25 
B. Beyond Informed Consent: Informational Standing Recognizes That 
Denial of Information Can Be an Injury in Its Own Right 
Early English and American law required no injury beyond the violation 
of a private right to sustain a cause of action.26  Legal scholars and justices 
throughout the 1700s and 1800s recognized that a right required an avenue 
for vindication or it was no right at all.27  Courts repeatedly found that 
when a plaintiff’s private rights were violated, despite any actual injury, 
nominal damages redressed the plaintiff sufficiently.28  This doctrine of 
standing was reevaluated in the 20th Century with the expansion of 
government regulations and public rights where courts began requiring an 
“injury-in-fact” and seemed to abandon the explicit “inquiry into the 
                                                          
 22. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8 (discussing Dean Prosser’s conclusion that the 
modern trend is to classify inadequate consent as negligence because that is in 
alignment with the general classification of medical malpractice as a type of 
negligence). 
 23. See id. at 11 (explaining the connection between informed consent and the 
cause of action). 
 24. See Marie v. McGreevey, 314 F.3d 136, 142-43 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that 
women who received abortions yet alleged inadequate informed consent did not have a 
legally recognized injury when abortions were performed competently).  Contra Cruz 
Aviles v. Bella Vista Hosp., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 200, 202 (D.P.R. 2000) (explaining 
that inadequate informed consent is not consent, therefore it is independent and does 
not require any additional medical malpractice in diagnosis or treatment). 
 25. See Schoendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s 
consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.”). 
 26. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 275, 279-80 (2008) (detailing the history of standing with regards to 
private rights). 
 27. See id. at 285-86 (exploring opinions of private rights within that time period to 
show that in a practical sense a right is defined as the existence of a legal remedy to 
defend it). 
 28. See id. at 279, 326 (discussing the history of nominal damages and noting the 
effectiveness of nominal damages in deterring police misconduct). 
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invasion of legal rights.”29 
Recently, the “injury-in-fact” requirement has begun to change with the 
recognition of a new class of injury through informational standing.30  In 
FEC v. Akins, a group of voters sought to challenge the Federal Election 
Commission’s (FEC) determination that the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC) was not a “political committee.”31  The plaintiffs 
brought suit alleging that the FEC decision denied them relevant 
information to which they were legally entitled under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) because the FEC’s determination allowed 
AIPAC to avoid making informational disclosures.32  Contrary to the 
Solicitor General’s argument that the plaintiffs did not suffer an “injury-in-
fact,” the Court held that the informational injury suffered here was 
adequately concrete and specific, and the information directly related to the 
exercise of a fundamental political right: voting.  Thus, Akins signals that 
when Congress creates a right to information, and a person is denied that 
information, that person may have standing without any further injury.33   
C. Maternity Care Is Uniquely Suited for a Test Case Analysis of the 
Adequacy of Informed Consent Statutes 
1. Maternity Care: Unique, yet Universal 
Pregnancy serves as a window through which to examine medical care 
and is an excellent platform for the analysis of a legal concept—informed 
consent—that applies to all forms of medical care.  Unlike many medical 
conditions, pregnancy is a predictable condition: for most women, 
pregnancy will culminate in labor and then birth after a gestation period of 
38-42 weeks.34  With no medical intervention, pregnancy culminates in a 
                                                          
 29. See Jonathan E. Wells, Comment, Shouldn’t Standing Be Closer to the Heart of 
Congressional Intent?, 49 EMORY L.J. 1359, 1365-66 (2000) (explaining the recent 
history of standing and criticizing how this judicial invention abandoned previous 
private right precedent). 
 30. See Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the 
Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677, 689 (2007) (discussing the 
informational standing doctrine developed in FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), as a 
novel method for expanding standing to any statutorily-identified group entitled to the 
information specified in the statute). 
 31. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 16-18 (explaining that by ruling AIPAC was not a 
political committee, the FEC shielded AIPAC from disclosure requirements because 
only political committees must meet the FECA disclosure requirements at issue). 
 32. See id. at 20 (noting that plaintiffs were simply citizens, not members of 
AIPAC; however, Congress explicitly gave all citizens standing in the language of 
FECA). 
 33. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: 
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 663-65 (1999) (exploring the application of 
prudential requirements to informational standing). 
 34. See generally JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED: THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT 
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birth that both mother and baby survive 99 out of 100 times.35  Although 
medical intervention is sometimes necessary, the predictability of the 
outcome without intervention allows medical intervention to be evaluated 
more readily with pregnancy than with other medical conditions.36  Again, 
in contrast to medical conditions that develop rapidly and do not grant 
sufficient time to analyze patient-physician interactions, maternity care 
serves as an optimal lens through which to examine patient-provider 
interactions because pregnancy develops over several months and the 
general standard of care involves many provider visits.37  Finally, while 
most people will not experience most medical conditions, the universality 
of birth is compelling: everyone begins life through birth, and the United 
States spends $86 billion each year on hospitalization related to pregnancy 
and childbirth.38 
2. Test Case Hypothetical 
Anecdotal and statistical evidence indicates that America’s maternity 
care system often fails to meet legal standards of informed consent and that 
the majority of women are left without legal remedy.39  Consequentially, 
this area has not been fully developed through case law, and this Comment 
will use Ashley Typical, a hypothetical patient, who is in good health at the 
time of conception and is low-risk and healthy through her pregnancy, as 
the test case patient based predominantly on the most common maternity 
care experiences. 
                                                          
CHILDBIRTH AND MODERN MATERNITY CARE 11 (2007) (explaining that the due date, a 
median within a normal range, is calculated by adding 280 days to the first day of the 
woman’s last menstrual period). 
 35. See Irvine Loudin, Maternal Mortality in the Past and Its Relevance to 
Developing Countries Today, 72 AM. J. CLIN. NUTR. 241S, 242S (2000) (detailing the 
historical rates of maternal mortality from the 1850s to 2000). 
 36. See id. at 244S, 245S (explaining how causes of maternal mortality have varied 
with societal changes). 
 37. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PRENATAL CARE: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1-2 (2009) [hereinafter HHS FAQ], available at 
http://www.womenshealth.gov/publications/our-publications/fact-sheet/prenatal-
care.pdf (defining prenatal care and detailing the recommended appointment schedule). 
 38. See AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CARE CRISIS 
IN THE USA 1 (2010) [hereinafter DEADLY DELIVERY], available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/deadlydelivery.pdf (discussing the 
economic and social costs of birth). 
 39. See EUGENE R. DECLERCQ, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTIONS, LISTENING TO MOTHERS 
II: REPORT OF THE SECOND NATIONAL U.S. SURVEY OF WOMEN’S CHILDBEARING 
EXPERIENCES 72-73 (2006) [hereinafter LISTENING SURVEY], available at 
http://www.childbirthconnection.org/listeningtomothers/ (analyzing a national survey 
of American women, who revealed anecdotal indignities, overall lack of choices, and 
significant knowledge gaps regarding the risks of the treatments that they had 
received). 
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Ms. Typical wanted to be pregnant.40  She first met her physician, Dr. 
OB, during her first prenatal appointment when she was nine weeks 
pregnant.41  She met with Dr. OB during thirteen prenatal appointments.42  
During one of her appointments, Ms. Typical expressed concern and fear 
about labor pain, and Dr. OB assured her that anesthesiologists at Hospital 
General are available 24/7, and she could have an epidural whenever she 
needed one.43  For clarity and simplicity, it is assumed that Ms. Typical 
asked no more questions regarding labor pain, and Dr. OB volunteered no 
additional information. 
During her fortieth week of pregnancy, labor began for Ms. Typical.44  
She proceeded to Hospital General, where she had planned to give birth.45  
Ms. Typical experienced pain in labor that intensified as her labor 
progressed.46  Upon her arrival at Hospital General, Ms. Typical’s freedom 
of movement was restricted; she was attached to an Electronic Fetal 
Monitor and an IV.47  She did not use the shower for pain relief.48  Ms. 
Typical labored in her labor and delivery room with her husband, but she 
did not have a doula.49  A registered nurse (RN) monitored and periodically 
checked on Ms. Typical, but the RN at no time offered comfort measures to 
help Ms. Typical labor.50  
                                                          
 40. See id. at 18 (reporting that the majority of participants (57%) wanted to be 
pregnant). 
 41. See id. at 20 (reporting that most women had their first prenatal appointment 
during the ninth week of pregnancy). 
 42. See id. at 21 (reporting that 73% of women saw the same provider each time 
and 79% of women had an obstetrician-gynecologist as their primary caregiver); see 
also HHS FAQ, supra note 37, at 3-4 (detailing the recommended standard of care, 
which involves many prenatal appointments). 
 43. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 164 (describing the climbing epidural rate that 
exceeds 99% at some hospitals and the decreasing availability of pain management 
options in labor). 
 44. See id. at 11 (detailing the median gestation is forty weeks). 
 45. See id. at xx (noting that in the United States, 99% of women give birth in a 
hospital). 
 46. See INA MAY GASKIN, BIRTH MATTERS 38-39 (2011) (refuting the assumptions 
that labor pain is pointless and inevitable and explaining that pain is not analogous to 
suffering and vice versa). 
 47. See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 34, at xix (describing the typical labor experience 
as involving up to 16 different tubes, drugs, or attachments restraining the laboring 
patient). 
 48. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (noting that while only 4% of 
women used the shower for pain relief, of those that did, the majority found it at least 
“somewhat helpful” and 33% found it “very helpful”). 
 49. See id. at 30 (reporting that 82% of women labored with a husband or partner 
for support, but only 3% used a doula, the popular name for a labor companion, 
typically a woman, who is trained to provide non-medical support to the laboring  
woman). 
 50. Cf. BLOCK, supra note 34, at 15 (discussing how professional pressures on 
nurses increase when technology is valued more than people). 
9
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When Dr. OB checked on her, Ms. Typical described her pain and asked 
for help managing it.51  Dr. OB said he could call the anesthesiologist to 
arrange an epidural.52  Ms. Typical met with the anesthesiologist who 
explained how the procedure would go and gave her an informed consent 
form filled with standard language regarding risks.53  She signed it and was 
given the epidural.54 
3. Test Case Statutes 
Ms. Typical’s situation will be analyzed under three state statutes: New 
York, Washington, and Wisconsin.  New York codified informed consent 
under “the reasonable medical practitioner” standard.55  Washington uses 
the “reasonably prudent patient” (RPP) standard.56  Wisconsin is a hybrid 
of the two standards because facially the statute is a “reasonably well-
qualified physician” standard, but as applied, Wisconsin courts consider it a 
“reasonably prudent patient” standard.57 
i. New York State 
For a cause of action under New York State’s informed consent statute, a 
plaintiff must establish that: (1) the foreseeable risks and benefits of the 
proposed treatment and any alternatives that a “reasonable medical . . . 
practitioner under similar circumstance would have disclosed” were not 
disclosed; (2) a “reasonably prudent patient” would have declined the 
treatment if proper disclosure occurred; and (3) the lack of informed 
consent proximately caused a legally recognized injury.58  Even if a 
plaintiff is able to show the first prong, the objective test of the second 
prong is difficult to satisfy because the fact finder will weigh the risk of 
having the procedure versus the risk of forgoing it, without considering 
                                                          
 51. See id. at 174-75 (discussing a laboring woman’s need to manage or work 
through labor pain). 
 52. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (reporting that the majority of 
surveyed mothers used epidural or spinal analgesia). 
 53. See GASKIN, supra note 46, at 24 (describing various side effects of the epidural 
procedure). 
 54. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (reporting that 76% of surveyed 
mothers used epidural or spinal analgesia). 
 55. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2011) (articulating a three 
prong test to sustain a cause of action). 
 56. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (2011) (articulating a four prong test a RPP 
must prove). 
 57. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2011) (articulating an incredibly broad duty of 
disclosure); see also Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 588 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Wis. 
1999) (articulating the test for disclosure as what the RPP would require to make an 
intelligent decision). 
 58. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2011) (describing the 
limitations on medical malpractice action for informed consent). 
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remote risks.59  In Avakian v. United States, the district court held that the 
“reasonably prudent patient” would find that when the risks of a 
myelogram (a diagnostic procedure), not including the remote risk of 
paralysis, were weighed against the patient’s chronic back pain, which 
could not be properly diagnosed and treated without the myelogram, the 
RPP would consent to a myelogram because the risks of forgoing treatment 
outweigh the procedure’s risks.60  Mrs. Avakian’s actual preference or risk 
tolerance was irrelevant because the standard used is an objective one.61 
In addition to establishing the first two prongs, there must be an injury 
beyond violating one’s right to bodily integrity for an informed consent 
claim to proceed.62  While New York courts have found a sufficient injury 
where a patient’s child is injured during birth, as occurred in Cerny v. 
Williams, the courts have not recognized a blood transfusion to be a 
sufficient injury even when it is against the person’s faith, as was the case 
in DiGeronimo v. Fuchs.63 
ii. Washington State 
Washington’s informed consent statute requires four elements to support 
an informed consent claim: (1) that the health care provider failed to 
disclose a “material fact;” (2) that the patient was either unaware or not 
fully informed of such “material fact;” (3) that without such “material 
fact,” a “reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would not 
have consent[ed] to the procedure;” and (4) that the treatment proximately 
caused the patient to suffer an injury.64 
In addition to this statute, Washington retains the common law action for 
                                                          
 59. See Avakian v. United States, 739 F. Supp. 724, 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding 
that the RPP would not consider remote risks, even serious ones such as paralysis). 
 60. See id. at 731-32 (holding that the RPP would weigh the risks of forgoing the 
myelogram against the ordinary risks of the procedure, which included nausea, 
seizures, and temporary disorientation). 
 61. See id. at 731 (omitting any discussion of plaintiff’s personal risk tolerance or 
valuation of treatment). 
 62. See DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding that 
a blood transfusion to a devout Jehovah’s Witness does not constitute a legally 
recognized injury because transfusion was lifesaving and New York does not have a 
wrongful life statute).  But see Cerny v. Williams, 822 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552-53 (App. 
Div. 2006) (holding that birth defects that occurred because a Cesarean section was 
delayed for unsuccessful induction would satisfy proximate injury if the plaintiff can 
establish that the Cesarean was not disclosed as an alternative). 
 63. See Cerny, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 552 (finding that the injuries to a patient’s child 
due to the mother’s medical treatment during labor would satisfy proximate injury).  
But see DiGeronimo, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 907 (holding that without physical harm or 
sufficient emotional distress, there is no injury). 
 64. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (2011) (describing the elements of proof 
required for an informed consent failure). 
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medical battery where no consent is obtained.65  Courts have held that 
medical battery protects an individual’s right to privacy and bodily 
integrity, whereas informed consent protects a patient’s autonomy through 
adequate information.66  As demonstrated in Degel v. Buty, the court 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that divorcing bodily integrity from informed 
consent and applying an objective standard violates a patient’s due process 
rights.67  Under Washington law, if a patient consents to a procedure, but 
would not have consented to the procedure had she known of an alternative 
that should have been disclosed, she will be without a legal remedy 
because: (1) if she fails the third prong (the RPP would have consented), 
she has no informed consent case; and (2) by her consent, though 
uninformed, she has foreclosed a battery action.68  The statute’s third prong 
is a factually driven inquiry, and as the court stated in Bundrick v. Stewart, 
even undisputed subjective consent prior to a procedure will not be 
dispositive for the objective test.69  The fourth prong is satisfied when a 
patient is injured by a risk he was unaware of or if he would have been 
uninjured had he chosen an undisclosed alternative; this can be determined 
by the fact-finder or through the parties’ stipulation.70 
iii. Wisconsin State 
Wisconsin’s informed consent statute is uncommonly broad and requires 
that physicians describe the risks, benefits, and all alternative treatments.71  
Wisconsin courts have held that disclosure requirements are necessary 
because patients need information in order to exercise intelligent treatment 
decisions.72  Furthermore, a competent patient has the absolute right to 
                                                          
 65. See Bundrick v. Stewart, 114 P.3d 1204, 1208 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) 
(discussing legislative history and statutory language to determine that enactment of an 
informed consent statute did not supersede a cause of action for medical battery). 
 66. See, e.g., id. (distinguishing between the purposes of battery and informed 
consent to establish why battery requires no injury). 
 67. See Degel v. Buty, 29 P.3d 768, 769-71 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (separating 
patient autonomy from bodily integrity because they are different rights that require 
different protections). 
 68. See id. (holding that because the standard for recovery and patient choice do 
not have a causal relationship, an objective standard for an informed consent action that 
ignores what a patient subjectively would have chosen may deny recovery, but does not 
deny her the right to determine her own care). 
 69. See id. (holding that the objective standard was not met and a reasonably 
prudent patient would have consented to the procedure despite conflicting expert 
testimony). 
 70. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1208 (further articulating the negligence standard as 
it differentiates from medical battery because no injury is required under battery). 
 71. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2011) (articulating the expansive disclosure 
requirement for treatment alternatives). 
 72. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 588 N.W.2d 26, 30 
(Wis. 1999) (detailing how informed consent is patient-driven because it is a central 
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choose among viable medical alternatives, even if the alternative is not per 
se recommended.73 
Wisconsin’s informed consent statute provides that a physician may 
defend his failure to disclose by asserting defenses such as: the information 
was beyond what a “reasonably well-qualified physician in a similar 
medical classification would know,” the information was so technical that 
it was beyond the patient’s comprehension, the information was already 
apparent or known to the patient, or there was an “extremely remote 
possibilit[y] that might [have] falsely or detrimentally alarm[ed] the 
patient.”74  The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Dibbel that 
though the list of defenses within the statute is not exhaustive, courts 
should be cautious when instructing juries on defenses not expressly 
provided in the informed consent statute.75  If the physician fails to disclose 
information and cannot assert a defense, courts apply a RPP test to 
determine whether the patient would have consented to the procedure if the 
information had been disclosed, thus creating a cause of action.76  Because 
Wisconsin courts view informed consent as a process, rather than an event, 
which may evolve with new medical or legal developments, patients can 
revoke consent.77  Thus, if the factual record shows the patient revoked 
consent, Wisconsin courts do not apply the objective test.78  Such was the 
case in Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., where the court held that the 
patient’s unequivocal revocation of consent should have triggered a new 
informed consent discussion.79 
Furthermore, Wisconsin courts have stressed that a patient does not have 
an affirmative duty to determine the completeness, accuracy, or 
truthfulness of the physician’s disclosures because of the special 
                                                          
method to ensure the fundamental right of bodily integrity). 
 73. See id. at 26, 29-32 (holding that a patient had an absolute right to choose a 
Cesarean section over an induction because both were viable medical options). 
 74. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (listing defenses to failing to disclose treatment 
information; other defenses that are not applicable for this hypothetical include 
emergency situations and incapable patients). 
 75. See Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358, 372 (Wis. 1999) (explaining that 
deviating from the specified defenses should only be considered when evidence of a 
specific reason for withholding information has been offered by the defendant). 
 76. See id. at 366 (explaining that Wisconsin follows the majority of jurisdictions 
by applying the objective test to prevent plaintiff’s hindsight from unfairly affecting 
litigation). 
 77. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 32-33 (declining to define informed consent as a 
singular event because, as circumstances change, the risks may change and/or the 
patient’s tolerance of risk may change). 
 78. See id. at 34 (stating that applying the objective test after clear revocation could 
lead to “absurd results”). 
 79. See id. at 34-35 (holding that once the patient requested a Cesarean section, the 
physician was required to revisit the risks and benefits of all viable medical options). 
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relationship of trust that patients have with their doctors.80  Nonetheless, 
Wisconsin’s patient-centered informed consent statute is still a negligence 
statute, requiring an injury to sustain a cause of action.81  Unlike New 
York, under Wisconsin’s informed consent statute, the injury may be a 
possible complication that arises out of a properly performed procedure; 
such as in Brown, when the plaintiff suffered discomfort and disfigurement 
arising from a properly performed double mastectomy.82 
III. ANALYSIS 
The disclosure of alternative procedures is an important aspect of 
informed consent because not having this type of information effectively 
restricts a patient’s ability to make intelligent choices about her own care.83  
Ms. Typical sought pain management, and she was offered only one 
treatment, an epidural, and was deemed to have “chosen” it.84  Even 
assuming Ms. Typical received adequate information regarding the risks of 
receiving an epidural through the standard informed consent form, Dr. OB 
never disclosed to Ms. Typical any alternative treatments for her labor pain 
at any point in her treatment.85 
A. In New York, Ms. Typical Does Not Have a Cause of Action Because 
Failure to Discuss Pain Management Alternatives Falls Within New York’s 
Limitations on Medical Malpractice Action Based on Lack of Informed 
Consent and Bars a Cause of Action. 
Even though Ms. Typical chose the only treatment option Dr. OB 
presented to her at any time during his eight-month treatment of her 
pregnancy, she will not be able to satisfy any of three prongs of New 
York’s informed consent statute necessary to establish a cause of action.86 
                                                          
 80. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 362 (declining to hold that the patient was guilty of 
contributory negligence for failing to ask additional questions because it is not the 
patient’s job to cure the physician’s failure to disclose). 
 81. See id. at 366 (explaining that the informed consent statute codifies the 
physicians’ duty, and when plaintiffs’ damages resulted from physicians’ breach of the 
duty to provide informed consent, they are liable for those damages). 
 82. See id. at 364-65 (holding that once the fact-finder finds that a reasonable 
patient would have refused the procedure, any harm that results from the procedure will 
be sufficient to sustain a negligence action under informed consent). 
 83. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10-12 (Cal. 1972) (holding reasonable 
disclosure of alternatives is a vital aspect of the physician’s duty). 
 84. See supra Part II.C.2 (describing the test patient’s situation). 
 85. See supra Part II.C.2 (noting that initially Ms. Typical described her concerns 
about labor pain and later asked for assistance managing pain, and in both instances Dr. 
OB offered an epidural as her “cure” without any discussion of alternatives). 
 86. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2011) (articulating a three-
prong test for a reasonably prudent medical practitioner). 
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1. Ms. Typical Is Unlikely to Satisfy the First Prong of the Informed 
Consent Statute Because a Reasonable Medical Practitioner Under Similar 
Circumstances Probably Would Not Have Disclosed Any Other Pain 
Management Alternatives. 
Under the first prong, Ms. Typical will have to establish that Dr. OB 
deviated from an accepted community standard of medical practice when 
he failed to disclose other pain management alternatives.87  Deviation from 
accepted medical practice is a factually driven inquiry that relies heavily on 
expert testimony but can still be decided as a matter of law or stipulated to 
by the parties.88 
Because normative practices often define standards of practice, it is 
important to remember that epidural rates are extraordinarily high 
compared to any other form of pain management technique.89  Given that 
some forms of pain management are considered as effective as epidurals at 
managing pain, yet lack some of the serious side effects, it may be inferred 
that many women are not fully aware of the availability and effectiveness 
of other pain management alternatives when they choose epidurals for pain 
management.90  Conflicting testimony of medical experts that a doctor 
deviated from accepted medical practice by not describing pain 
management alternatives is not sufficient to create a question of fact as to 
whether the patient acted under informed consent.91  Even if Ms. Typical 
has an expert testify that he or she would have disclosed alternate pain 
management options, a court, as occurred in Cerny, may be unconvinced 
by the expert’s testimony when it considers the sheer magnitude of epidural 
usage in labor as compared to other methods.92  Therefore, the court is 
likely to rule as a matter of law that Dr. OB did not deviate from the 
                                                          
 87. See, e.g., DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927 N.Y.S.2d 904, 907 (Sup. Ct. 2011) 
(detailing that under a medical negligence standard the physician’s duty is defined by 
complying with community standards). 
 88. See Cerny v. Williams, 822 N.Y.S.2d 548, 555 (App. Div. 2006) (allowing 
parties to stipulate that failing to undertake the curative step of a Cesarean section was 
not in accordance with the doctor’s standard of care). 
 89. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (reporting that epidural use far 
exceeds other pain management techniques). 
 90. See GASKIN, supra note 46, at 38-40, 53-54 (exploring women’s attitudes about 
pain in labor and detailing their lack of knowledge of other effective pain relief 
methods such as doulas, comfort measures, or water (bath or shower)). 
 91. See id. at 38-39 (noting that in Cerny, even though the plaintiffs’ medical 
expert testified that a forty-three minute delay to begin a Cesarean section following a 
failed induction was a departure from accepted medical practice, the court found the 
expert’s testimony unconvincing and held as a matter of law that there was no 
departure from standard medical practice). 
 92. See Cerny, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 553 (holding that as a matter of law, a forty-three 
minute delay from the time that the Pitocin was discontinued until the delivery was not 
inconsistent with acceptable standards of care despite conflicting expert testimony). 
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standard of practice.93  Again, because disclosure is measured normatively, 
it is likely that Dr. OB could establish as a matter of fact, even if not as a 
matter of law, that he did not deviate from the standard of practice by only 
describing, then offering, the epidural as Ms. Typical’s only treatment 
option for her pain.94 
2. Ms. Typical Is Unlikely to Satisfy the Second Prong of the Informed 
Consent Statute Because a Reasonably Prudent Patient Would Probably 
Consent to an Epidural for Pain Management. 
New York’s RPP calculates treatment decisions by considering the risks 
of the treatment compared to the risks of refusing the treatment without 
considering remote risks.95  In Avakian, the court found that the RPP would 
have consented to a myelogram because the risk of forgoing the myelogram 
outweighed the risks of the procedure.96  The court also held that the RPP 
would not consider the remote possibility of paralysis, even though there 
were at least two reported cases of irreversible neurological 
complications.97  Further, consenting to a myelogram did not guarantee that 
Mrs. Avakian would be cured of her pain, and the facts that Mrs. Avakian 
had periodically suffered back pain throughout her life, was an active 
mother of a small child, and contributed to family finances by working 
outside the home did not enter into the RPP calculus.98 
Just as the myelogram may have diagnosed Mrs. Avakian’s condition but 
did not guarantee relief, an epidural may grant a majority of women relief 
but will be ineffective for a minority of laboring mothers.99  While labor 
pain is temporary rather than chronic, and the procedure is different, the 
risk factors of epidurals are similar to myelograms: laboring women may 
experience nausea; headaches; itching; incomplete pain relief; a dangerous 
                                                          
 93. See id. (holding that an expert’s testimony does not necessarily create an issue 
of fact). 
 94. See id. at 550-52 (indicating that whether the defendant committed medical 
negligence and failed to obtain informed consent before inducing plaintiff was an issue 
of fact). 
 95. See Avakian v. United States, 739 F. Supp. 724, 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(dismissing even serious risks such as death because the RPP does not consider such 
remote risks). 
 96. See id. at 731-32 (holding that the risks of the myelogram were low and worth 
taking because the myelogram could have proven that Avakian had a herniated disc, 
which, if properly treated, may have alleviated her intermittent back pain). 
 97. See id. at 731 (noting that at the time the procedure was performed only two 
known cases of paralysis resulted from the approximately 2.5 million myelograms that 
had been performed). 
 98. See id. at 726-28 (concluding that Mrs. Avakian’s decision to seek treatment 
was dispositive of her risk valuation). 
 99. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (reporting that 9% of surveyed 
women found that epidurals were not at all helpful or not very helpful in managing 
labor pain, and an additional 10% of women surveyed found it only somewhat helpful). 
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drop in blood pressure experienced by 20-30% of women; a fever which 
will develop in 15-20% of women; blocking of natural endorphins; 
increased risk of pelvic, pelvic floor, and vaginal injury; and increased risk 
of Cesarean section.100  Though epidural patients face increased risk of 
paralysis compared to myelogram patients, the risk of paralysis or death, 
though possible, is remote; therefore, in New York, the RPP would 
disregard those risks.101  Overall, a New York court is likely to find that a 
myelogram is similar enough to an epidural for the court to find that the 
RPP would probably consent to an epidural.102  Furthermore, an epidural’s 
popularity is likely to be a dispositive factor.103  Hence, it seems likely that 
regardless of whether Ms. Typical would have consented to an epidural if 
she had other options, in New York, the RPP would have consented. 
3. Ms. Typical Is Unlikely to Satisfy the Third Prong of the Informed 
Consent Statute Because Even if Ms. Typical Is Injured as a Result of 
Receiving the Epidural, the Lack of Informed Consent Would Not Be the 
Proximate Cause of Her Injuries. 
Finally, unless Ms. Typical has a separate cause of action for a 
negligently administered epidural, she will not have an injury sufficient to 
support the damage necessary for a lack of informed consent cause of 
action.104  As the court held in Avakian, the mere occurrence of a possible 
risk does not satisfy the proximate injury element if the physician performs 
the procedure properly.105  Conversely, the court in Cerny v. Williams 
found that if the mother was not informed about the risks of induction and 
the induction was not performed in accordance with the standard of care, 
then any injuries caused to the child by delaying a Cesarean section would 
                                                          
 100. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 172, 174 (describing the procedure of inserting a 
needle into the epidural space surrounding the spinal cord, then replacing the needle 
with a catheter through which an anesthetic and opiate cocktail “bathes” the spinal 
nerves and numbs all or most feeling below the navel). 
 101. See DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 38, at 77 (describing the risk of infection 
that results from inserting a needle into the spinal space and that can result in 
meningitis and death). 
 102. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 171 (detailing that though epidurals have many 
side effects and are associated with longer labors, increased likelihood of vaginal tears 
or episiotomies, and increased rates of Cesarean sections, the remote risks of death or 
paralysis are very rare, much like the myelogram procedure). 
 103. See LISTENING SURVEY, supra note 39, at 32 (stating that more than 75% of 
women surveyed used an epidural for pain management). 
 104. See Avakian v. United States, 739 F. Supp. 724, 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(explaining that injuries which occur as part of a properly performed medical procedure 
are not sufficient to constitute proximate cause for policy reasons). 
 105. See id. at 732-33 (holding that because her doctor complied with the necessary 
standard of care, Mrs. Avakian’s injuries would not support a malpractice claim as it 
would be unreasonable and impractical to hold a doctor liable for a procedure that did 
not yield a good result when he has exercised the necessary skill). 
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have been a proximate cause; however, in that instance, Mrs. Cerny would 
have had a separate cause of action for a medical malpractice for an 
improperly performed induction. 106  Furthermore, intangible injuries, such 
as violating one’s bodily integrity by giving a blood transfusion against 
one’s wishes and/or religious beliefs, will not suffice as an injury.107 
Thus, even in the remote and unlikely scenario that Ms. Typical were to 
die or suffer paralysis as a result of her epidural, so long as the epidural 
was properly administered, she would not have an injury under the third 
prong of New York’s statute.108  If Ms. Typical receives a negligently 
administered epidural that causes her harm, such as an infection, paralysis, 
or death, then those injuries would likely satisfy the third prong of the 
statute, but she would also have a separate claim for malpractice.109  If Ms. 
Typical is offended or distressed because she feels coerced into her choice 
like Mrs. DiGeronimo, who suffered emotional distress from having 
another person’s blood transfused into her body against her religious 
beliefs even though this was not a sufficient injury to sustain a cause of 
action, Ms. Typical’s distress will certainly fail to be an injury.110 
To sustain a malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, a 
plaintiff must meet all three elements of New York’s informed consent 
statute.111  Since Ms. Typical is unlikely to meet all three, she cannot 
sustain an action based on inadequate informed consent in New York State. 
B. In Washington State, Ms. Typical Likely Does Not Have a Cause of 
Action Because Failure to Discuss Pain Management Alternatives 
Probably Will Not Meet the Necessary Elements of Proof to Establish That 
Dr. OB Failed to Secure Informed Consent. 
Washington State requires four elements of proof to establish a failure to 
secure informed consent: (1) the medical provider did not disclose to the 
patient a “material” fact or facts relating to the procedure; (2) the patient 
                                                          
 106. See Cerny v. Williams, 822 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that 
since the Cesarean section was performed without malpractice, any actual injuries 
suffered would not be legally recognized because some injuries will still naturally arise 
during properly performed treatment). 
 107. See DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927 N.Y.S.2d 904, 907 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding that 
plaintiff did not receive a legally cognizable injury when she was given a lifesaving 
blood transfusion even though she was a devout Jehovah’s Witness). 
 108. See id. (holding that without a departure from good, acceptable medical care 
there can be no legally recognized injury). 
 109. See id. (determining that a properly performed blood transfusion could not 
sustain a malpractice case, but a transfusion that transmitted disease, was the wrong 
blood type, or was delayed would result in a valid case). 
 110. See id. at 908 (defining an injury in a medical malpractice case as causally 
related to the breach of care). 
 111. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2011) (articulating a three 
prong test based on a reasonably prudent medical practitioner standard). 
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consented to the procedure with no or inadequate knowledge of said facts; 
(3) a RPP would not have consented had she known the undisclosed 
“material facts;” and (4) the procedure proximately caused injury to the 
patient.112 
1. Ms. Typical May Be Able to Establish the First Two Prongs of the 
Informed Consent Statute Because These Prongs Are Generally Undisputed 
or Are Questions of Fact for the Jury. 
Courts rarely discuss the first two elements of the statute, as they are 
factually bound inquiries, and most parties to the litigation will not dispute 
treatment information as material facts.113  The parties can, and often do, 
stipulate to these elements as in Degel, where the defendant stipulated that 
he did not get his patient’s consent before performing the artificial 
rupturing of her membranes (AROM).114  When there is dispute over an 
element, as occurred in Bundrick, where the parties disagreed as to whether 
Mrs. Bundrick consented to the procedure, the evidence is submitted to the 
jury.115 
In Ms. Typical’s case, because the Washington courts classify most 
information that a patient could consider when making a treatment decision 
a material fact, it seems likely that the court would find pain management 
alternatives to be material facts. 116  The parties will likely either stipulate to 
Ms. Typical’s consent, as in Degel, or leave it as a question of fact for the 
factfinder, as the court found in Bundrick.117  Dr. OB never discussed any 
alternative procedures, and the availability and effectiveness of alternative 
pain management techniques would likely have been material facts Ms. 
Typical would have at least considered before consenting to the epidural.  
Therefore, a Washington court is unlikely to find she was fully informed 
under the statute.  Nonetheless, Ms. Typical’s signed consent form may 
persuade a jury that she consented even if she did not have the information 
                                                          
 112. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 7.70.050 (2011) (stating that a plaintiff must prove 
each element of the four-prong test to sustain a claim). 
 113. See, e.g., Bundrick v. Steward, 114 P.3d 1204, 1208-09 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding as a matter of law that the surgeon’s identity is a material fact). 
 114. See Degel v. Buty, 29 P.3d 768, 769 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (describing the 
defendant’s stipulation that he did not discuss the material risks of the AROM with his 
patient). 
 115. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1209 (finding that the jury must determine if the 
plaintiff consented by considering evidence of the plaintiff’s oral claims against her 
broad written consent). 
 116. See id. at 1208-10 (noting that the resident’s participation in plaintiff’s surgery 
was a material fact); see also Degel, 29 P.3d at 769 (considering the risk of cord 
prolapse during AROM a material fact). 
 117. See Degel, 29 P.3d at 770 (allowing parties to stipulate that defendant did not 
seek plaintiff’s consent before performing the procedure); Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1208-
10 (sending the consent question to the jury). 
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required to satisfy the statute.118 
2. Ms. Typical Is Unlikely to Establish the Third Prong of the Informed 
Consent Statute Because a Reasonably Prudent Patient Would Probably 
Consent to an Epidural for Pain Management. 
Like in New York, Washington courts apply an objective test to 
determine whether the physician’s disclosure satisfies informed consent.119  
However, unlike New York’s strict balancing of the risks test, which does 
not consider remote risks, Washington courts consider the broader 
circumstances, including remote risks, when determining if a RPP would 
have consented to the epidural.120  In Degel, the jury found for the 
defendant, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions and despite conflicting 
expert testimony that quantified the risk of cord prolapse, a life threatening 
complication for the fetus when a physician performs AROM when the 
fetus is high in the pelvis.121  In Bundrick, a jury found the plaintiff’s 
signature on a broad standard informed consent form was more dispositive 
of the RPP’s consent than the plaintiff’s oral qualifications limiting the 
scope of the informed consent form prior to the surgery.122  Because it is 
difficult to predict what weight a fact-finder will give different pieces of 
evidence, the outcome of any inquiry is not certain.123  Since the majority 
of laboring women use epidurals as their primary method of pain relief, 
Ms. Typical will face the same hurdles the plaintiff in Degel faced because 
Ms. Typical is not likely to overcome the burden of proof necessary to 
show that the RPP would not have consented to an epidural.124  Like 
Bundrick, Ms. Typical will also have to refute a signed consent form, and it 
seems unlikely that Ms. Typical will be able to overcome these factors and 
                                                          
 118. See Degel, 29 P.3d at 770 (finding that knowledge is a factual inquiry best 
performed by the fact-finder). 
 119. See id. (explaining that the objective test prevents plaintiffs from stating that 
they would not have consented had they known the risks before they manifested). 
 120. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1209-10 (holding that it is the jury who must weigh 
the various circumstances to determine whether a RPP would have consented to the 
procedure at issue). 
 121. See Degel, 29 P.3d at 769 (noting that defendant admitted to forgoing patient 
consent for AROM because he believed her consent to induction included AROM). 
 122. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1209 (explaining that the jury found the plaintiff’s 
signed, broad consent to “all medical treatment . . . performed . . . by/or at the direction 
of the attending physician” was more dispositive of a RPP standard than plaintiff’s oral 
rejection of a resident actually operating with her surgeon rather than simply observing 
him). 
 123. See id. (finding that although alternate conclusions may be drawn from the 
same evidence, ultimately the jury makes the final determination on matters of fact). 
 124. See Degel, 29 P.3d at 769 (describing expert testimony that stated the expert 
had never had a patient decline an AROM after being informed of the risks and finding 
that persuasive as a matter of law). 
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prevail on this objective prong.125 
3. Unless Ms. Typical Is Injured During the Administration of the Epidural, 
She Will Not Have a Cause of Action. 
Similar to New York, Washington has classified the lack of informed 
consent as a type of medical negligence.126  Washington’s causation 
standard is lower than New York’s standard; if an injury occurs that the 
physician did not disclose and that would not have occurred if the patient 
had chosen an undisclosed alternative, then the injury satisfies the causal 
element of the Washington statute.127  Hence, in Bundrick, if the plaintiff 
could have passed the objective test for the bowel injury she received 
during the surgery and the additional surgery complications that resulted, 
without any showing of further negligence beyond the lack of informed 
consent, she would have sustained a cause of action.128  Thus, if a properly 
administered epidural injured Ms. Typical, she will satisfy this final 
element of proof, but without an injury, Ms. Typical will lack a cause of 
action.129 
Nonetheless, because failing just one element of the negligence standard 
makes it impossible to prove failure to secure informed consent, and Ms. 
Typical is likely to fail both the objective RPP test and the injury 
requirement, she is unlikely to have a cause of action under the Washington 
standard.130 
C. Under Wisconsin Law, Failure to Discuss Pain Management 
Alternatives Likely Violates Dr. OB’s Statutory Obligation to Provide 
Information, but Ms. Typical Probably Will Not Have a Cause of Action 
Unless She Is Injured by the Administration of the Epidural. 
On its face, Wisconsin’s informed consent statute requires the disclosure 
of all the risks, benefits, and alternative treatments and specifies a few 
                                                          
 125. See Bundrick, 114 P.3d at 1209 (describing the weaknesses of standard consent 
forms but upholding the jury’s finding that the signed consent form was dispositive of 
consent). 
 126. See id. at 1207-08 (determining that negligent conduct without proximate 
injury does not satisfy a negligence standard). 
 127. See id. (discussing proximate injury in comparison to battery cause of action 
where no injury is required). 
 128. See id. (stating that injuries which result from medical malpractice have a 
separate cause of action, so it would be absurd to require malpractice to meet the injury 
prong). 
 129. See id. (holding that whether the sutures that led to the complications were 
improperly done or not was irrelevant to determining injury if the operation itself 
lacked consent). 
 130. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (2011) (stating that if the plaintiff fails on 
any element, then the claim fails). 
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defenses, such as that the “information is beyond what a reasonably well-
qualified physician in a similar medical classification would know.”131  
Wisconsin courts have created an additional test for informed consent by 
consistently holding that the only information required is that which a RPP 
would need to make an intelligent treatment decision.132  The failure to 
disclose such required information is a negligent act in violation of the 
statute; but, to sustain a negligence cause of action for inadequate informed 
consent, the plaintiff must have an injury.133 
1. Available Pain Management Alternatives Are Likely to Be Alternative 
Modes of Treatment That Would Require Disclosure. 
All viable medical options that a “reasonably well-qualified physician 
would know” must be disclosed to the patient, even if the options are not 
considered medically indicated.134  Because the court in Schreiber clearly 
articulated that Wisconsin courts find informed consent is a process rather 
than a singular event, a court could hold that Ms. Typical’s interactions 
with Dr. OB from the prenatal appointments onward were opportunities for 
Dr. OB to meet his statutory obligations.135  While comfort measures (such 
as point pressure or massage) or water therapy (such as bathtubs or 
showers) may not offer the same pain management effectiveness as 
epidurals do for the majority of laboring women, some laboring women 
have found these pain management techniques effective, and these 
techniques are all much less invasive and have none of the serious risks 
associated with epidurals.136  Therefore, just as the patient in Brown could 
compare a double mastectomy with periodic mammograms or a needle 
biopsy even though the procedures had different risks and effectiveness in 
identifying or preventing breast cancer, a court is likely to find that Ms. 
Typical would want the ability to consider various pain management 
alternatives with different risks and degrees of effectiveness in alleviating 
                                                          
 131. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2011) (articulating an expansive disclosure 
requirement with limited defenses for justifying disclosure failures such as emergency 
situations). 
 132. See Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358, 366 (Wis. 1999) (determining the 
doctor’s duty to provide information from the patient’s need because the purpose of 
informed consent is patient autonomy). 
 133. See id. at 365 (holding that known, possible complications of a properly 
executed procedure will suffice as an injury to sustain a negligence cause of action). 
 134. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (articulating an expansive disclosure requirement). 
 135. See Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 588 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Wis. 1999) 
(holding that while, at some point in most procedures, a patient may no longer be able 
to withdraw consent for practical reasons there is no need to arbitrarily create a moment 
of informed consent at a particular point in the treatment). 
 136. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 174-75 (comparing epidural effectiveness and 
possible side effects with other pain relief methods to illustrate that epidurals are 
excellent tools when necessary but should be applied cautiously). 
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her pain before making her decision.137  Furthermore, given that pain 
management techniques such as comfort measures, water therapy, doulas, 
and encouraging freedom of movement have been sufficiently studied to be 
classified as evidence-based alternatives, it is unlikely that a Wisconsin 
court would accept Dr. OB’s possible defense that a “reasonably well-
qualified” obstetrician would be unfamiliar with these alternatives.138  
Whether Dr. OB would find them medically indicated is irrelevant since 
the court in Schreiber held that the doctor’s opinion of the treatment option 
is immaterial.139  Thus, Ms. Typical would likely be able to establish that 
information regarding alternative pain management treatments is the type 
of information that Wisconsin’s informed consent statute requires. 
2. Even Though a Reasonably Prudent Patient Would Likely Consider 
Knowledge of Other Pain Management Techniques Required to Make an 
Informed Decision, a Reasonably Prudent Patient May Still Choose an 
Epidural to Treat Labor Pain. 
Unlike the objective standards previously analyzed under the New York 
and Washington laws, Wisconsin courts use the RPP standard to first 
determine what information must be disclosed, rather than using it solely as 
a predictor for what treatment the RPP would choose.140  Another unique 
aspect of Wisconsin law is that if a patient unequivocally states her 
subjective treatment decision prior to the procedure or injury, then 
Wisconsin courts do not consider whether the RPP would have made a 
different treatment decision.141  In Brown, the RPP would have required 
knowledge of less invasive alternatives and an adequate explanation of the 
procedure’s risks before the RPP could make an intelligent decision as to 
whether she should undergo a double mastectomy.142  After the Brown 
court determined that the RPP would require that information, the jury 
                                                          
 137. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 371-73 (weighing the probability of contracting 
breast cancer against the effectiveness and risks of various treatment options). 
 138. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 36-38 (examining common practices in maternity 
care and evaluating their effectiveness to find that many routine practices such as 
supine pushing are classified as “ineffective or harmful” while many untraditional 
methods such as ensuring freedom of movement are “beneficial”). 
 139. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 30-31 (holding that a patient has the right to 
choose any of the medically-viable treatments without being limited by a physician’s 
recommendation). 
 140. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 366 (emphasizing that patient autonomy requires 
adequate information). 
 141. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 34 (explaining that the objective test prevents a 
patient’s decisions from being affected by hindsight, but when a patient’s decision is 
clearly articulated prior to the procedure, the objective test should not be applied 
because it may lead to “absurd results”). 
 142. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 364 (determining that without adequate information 
the choice becomes illusory). 
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found that, based on all the statutorily required treatment information of 
risks, benefits, and alternatives, a RPP would not have consented to a 
double mastectomy.143  In Schreiber, the court held that a RPP would have 
wanted to have additional information regarding the risks and benefits of 
continuing the Vaginal Birth After Cesarean (VBAC) compared with a 
Cesarean section.144  Furthermore, because the patient in Schreiber clearly 
articulated that she did not want to proceed with the VBAC and, instead, 
wanted her physician to perform the Cesarean section, the court held it was 
not necessary to determine whether a RPP would have continued to the 
VBAC or opted for a Cesarean section because the patient’s undisputed 
wishes refuted any claim of hindsight.145 
Here, Ms. Typical should be able to establish that a RPP would need to 
know pain management alternatives to make an informed decision 
regarding treatment options because, by offering her only one pain 
management option, Dr. OB circumscribed Ms. Typical’s decision-making 
ability.146  Wisconsin’s clear emphasis on patient autonomy strongly 
supports the inference that a RPP requires knowledge regarding treatment 
alternatives.147  However, because epidural rates are so high in America, 
and the most serious risks⎯paralysis and death⎯are very remote, it may 
be difficult to establish that a RPP would not have consented to an 
epidural.148  Nonetheless, in light of rising maternal mortality rates, the 
United States’ poor maternal health care rating in comparison to other 
industrialized nations, and the coercive nature that many argue is rampant 
in maternity care, the proposition that the average patient is no longer a 
RPP when it comes to maternity care is not an unreasonable one.149  
Therefore, it is uncertain whether Ms. Typical can pass the Wisconsin RPP 
test. 
 
                                                          
 143. See id. (acknowledging that a double mastectomy is an invasive procedure that 
cannot completely eliminate the chance that a woman will develop breast cancer). 
 144. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 37 (specifying that new conditions require 
evolving discussions of informed consent). 
 145. See id. at 34 (arguing that clearly articulated, subjective intent prior to the 
procedures shifts the standard from an objective standard to a subjective standard). 
 146. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 366 (conveying that requiring that the patient be 
provided with a broad range of information during the informed consent process helps 
to assure the patient’s autonomy). 
 147. See id. at 369 (describing the importance of informed consent in protecting 
fundamental rights and describing the patient’s dependence on the doctor to provide 
information material to the patient’s ability to make an informed decision). 
 148. See id. at 364 (inferring that a reasonably prudent patient will accept some level 
of risk, particularly depending on the benefits of the procedure). 
 149. See DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 38, at 1, 3, 79 (reporting that maternity care 
failures in America have risen to the point of human rights violations). 
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3. Unless Ms. Typical Receives an Injury Caused by the Administration of 
the Epidural, She Will Not Have a Cause of Action. 
Under Wisconsin state law, failure to obtain informed consent is a type 
of medical malpractice, which is a negligence cause of action.150  
Therefore, even though a physician would be in breach of his duty to 
inform by failing to disclose all of the information required by the statute, a 
patient would not have a cause of action unless he or she could show a 
proximate injury.151  However, Wisconsin courts consider any injury, even 
normal complications that result from the un-consented procedure, to be a 
proximate injury.152  Hence, when the plaintiff in Brown suffered 
disfigurement and discomfort following her double mastectomy, she 
sustained sufficient injuries to succeed in an informed consent cause of 
action.153  Injuries that result from a physician’s failure to comply with a 
patient’s request can also sustain an action, as in Schreiber, where if the 
physician had performed the requested Cesarean section at any point during 
the seven and a half hours following the plaintiff’s initial request, the child 
would have been born healthy.154 
Here, if Ms. Typical and her child experience no injury as a result of the 
epidural, she will not have a cause of action.155  Even if Ms. Typical can 
unequivocally establish that the statute requires the disclosure of pain 
management alternatives, that a RPP would have required information 
about these alternatives to make an intelligent decision, and that a RPP 
would not have consented to an epidural had she known of the other 
alternatives, she cannot sustain a claim without a legally recognized injury 
because informed consent is a negligence action.156 
                                                          
 150. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 33 (explaining that failing to ensure informed 
consent is a negligent act that requires a proximate injury for a cause of action). 
 151. See id. (holding that if plaintiff’s daughter had been born healthy, then the 
plaintiff would not have had a cause of action). 
 152. See Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 365 (finding that plaintiff’s disfigurement and pain 
following the properly performed surgery constituted an injury). 
 153. See id. (indicating that although the case had to be remanded for a new trial, on 
other grounds, the jury originally awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in damages). 
 154. See Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 32-35 (holding that plaintiff’s daughter was born 
a spastic quadriplegic because she was not delivered prior to plaintiff’s uterus rupture, 
which would not have occurred had the physician ceded to patient’s request). 
 155. See BLOCK, supra note 34, at 174-75 (describing how one percent of women 
may experience a severe spinal headache, but only 1 in 100,000 women might 
experience severe complications such as death or paralysis). 
 156. See WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2011) (describing informed consent as the 
codification of a physician’s duty). 
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D. Informational Standing Could Provide a Legally Cognizable Injury and 
Allow Ms. Typical to Pursue a Cause of Action in Some Jurisdictions. 
Informational standing is a possible mechanism to remedying violations 
of informed consent that do not result in any injury other than the denial of 
information and, consequentially, infringe upon the private right of bodily 
integrity.157  In FEC v. Akins, the plaintiffs were denied information to 
which they were legally entitled, and the Court speculated that this 
information would have aided the citizens in making their choice at the 
polling booth.158  The FEC was not prohibiting the plaintiffs from voting, 
but by restricting information the FEC infringed on the plaintiffs’ 
fundamental right enough to constitute an injury-in-fact.159  By analogy, 
when a physician does not disclose adequate information for a patient to 
provide informed consent, that lack of information could constitute a 
sufficient injury to sustain a legal claim, even if the damages may be 
nominal, because such a remedy is necessary to protect bodily integrity, a 
fundamental right.160  Unlike its common law ancestor medical battery, in 
which a mere offensive touching without injury constituted a cause of 
action, lawmakers have codified informed consent as a subset of medical 
negligence.161  Thus, if there is no injury, there is no remedy, even if the 
physician violated the right.162 
Nevertheless, recognizing an injury will not sustain a cause of action in 
all three jurisdictions.  In New York State, the state statute will still prohibit 
Ms. Typical from exercising her right of action to recover for lack of 
informed consent because Ms. Typical is likely to fail all three elements of 
the informed consent statute, even if the last element, proximate injury, is 
satisfied.163  In Washington State, if Washington law recognizes 
                                                          
 157. See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 640 (hypothesizing that FEC v. Akins, 523 U.S. 
11 (1998), could be interpreted to allow Congress to give any citizen standing by 
creating specific legal interests in the rights any specific legislation intends to protect). 
 158. See Akins, 523 U.S. at 21 (explaining the importance of the information to 
voters, but nonetheless noting it was unnecessary to support the purpose further 
because of the clear statutory empowerment of the voters by Congress). 
 159. See id. at 11, 12 (holding the voters passed the testing requirement without 
overturning the FEC regulations). 
 160. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 129-30 (N.Y. 1914) 
(holding that the autonomy to determine what happens to one’s own body is a 
fundamental right, except in the face of an emergency where informed consent cannot 
be obtained because the patient is unconscious). 
 161. See Shipley, supra note 16 (noting every state has an informed consent statute 
and violations of the statute are a type of medical malpractice). 
 162. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1957) (explaining that disclosing information or withholding information 
regarding the level of risk of a procedure, when obtaining a patient’s informed consent, 
requires the physician to exercise professional judgment). 
 163. See supra Part III.A (analyzing Ms. Typical’s situation under New York State 
law, showing she lacks a cause of action). 
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informational standing as an injury, Ms. Typical may be able to prove 
failure to secure informed consent, but the key issue will be whether she 
can pass Washington’s RPP standard, which cannot be determined 
conclusively.164  Finally, under Wisconsin state law, Ms. Typical would 
likely have a cause of action under Breach of the Physician’s Duty to 
Inform because the only element that she conclusively failed to establish 
was proximate injury.165  Informational standing does not unite informed 
consent with medical battery, but in some jurisdictions, it could prevent the 
courts from barring legal remedies for informed consent violations that 
occur without additional injury. 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Despite spending more money on maternity care than any country in the 
world, America’s maternity care system is ranked almost last among 
industrialized nations.166  America is one of only four nations with 
increasing maternal mortality, and American women today are twice as 
likely to die because of childbirth as their mothers.167  Society has 
permitted litigation fears and defensive medicine to coerce women’s 
choices in childbirth, and the outcomes for women have not improved.168  
On principle, coercion is incompatible with patient autonomy and 
American values, but in practice, it drives a maternity care system that is 
expensive and poor.169  Choice and consumerism drive improvement in the 
marketplace, and healthcare is a market that suffers without choice.170 
By analyzing three different standards for determining what constitutes a 
violation of a patient’s informed consent rights, clear differences stand out.  
In states like New York, patients cannot remedy an informed consent 
failure. 171  So long as a physician is not negligent, a patient cannot sustain 
                                                          
 164. See supra Part III.B (analyzing Ms. Typical’s situation under Washington law, 
showing she probably lacks a cause of action). 
 165. See supra Part III.C (analyzing Ms. Typical’s situation under Wisconsin law, 
showing she may have a cause of action). 
 166. See DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 38, at xx (noting that although the United 
States’ care of severely premature infants is among the best in the world, a woman is 
seventy percent more likely to die in childbirth in America than in Europe). 
 167. See id. at 4 (noting that of the four world nations with increasing maternal 
mortality, the United States and Canada stand alone, as Afghanistan has been war torn 
for ten years, and Norway had a statistically insignificant increase). 
 168. See GASKIN, supra note 46, at 5-7 (describing how physicians can distort 
information to coerce patient choices). 
 169. See id. (detailing American maternity care costs per capita that are two to three 
times as high as those in countries of comparable wealth). 
 170. See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 34, 267-71 (describing the complex interplay of 
rights and economics in the eighty billion dollar a year maternity care industry). 
 171. See DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (upholding 
the injury requirement even when the medical treatment offends the patient’s religious 
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a cause of action even if a physician intentionally withholds important 
treatment information; therefore, without an avenue to remedy informed 
consent violations, New York patients lack a right to informed consent.172  
All states should, instead, follow Washington and Wisconsin in adopting 
the reasonably prudent patient standard because, in practice, using the 
reasonable medical provider standards cedes almost absolute discretion to 
the physician.173  Though the RPP standard serves an important role for 
minimizing litigation and allowing hindsight to dictate a patient’s priorities 
after the fact, states like Wisconsin are correct to decline to apply this 
objective test in the face of clear revocation or clear limitations of consent 
prior to the treatment.174 
Bodily integrity, like property rights, depends on exclusivity to define 
the outer edges of the right.175  Thus, requiring an injury beyond the 
invasion of bodily integrity is a troublesome issue that the concept of 
informational standing could remedy.176  Just as the Akins court held that 
failing to disclose political information circumscribed suffrage rights, 
failing to disclose treatment information circumscribes bodily integrity.177  
States should recognize informational standing in this context because it 
would give plaintiffs the opportunity to sustain a cause of action, which 
would allow courts to define and defend the right to informed consent.178 
This Comment used maternity care for its informed consent analysis 
because maternity care lends itself to comparison and analysis more easily 
than other aspects of our health care system, but the vulnerabilities of 
patient autonomy exist in all medical fields. 
 
                                                          
beliefs and finding that the patient’s emotional distress regarding the blood transfusion 
did not constitute an injury). 
 172. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (holding that a 
right without a remedy is no right at all). 
 173. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10-12 (Cal. 1972) (holding the physician’s 
disclosure decisions can circumscribe patient autonomy). 
 174. See Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 588 N.W.2d 26, 34 (Wis. 1999) 
(stating that applying an objective test in the face of clear revocation of consent could 
lead to “absurd results”). 
 175. See Hessick, supra note 26, at 279-81 (explaining how redress, even through 
notional damages, protects and defines rights). 
 176. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 523 U.S. 11, 12 (1998) (holding that 
Congress may grant standing to citizens to enforce statutory information disclosure 
requirements). 
 177. See id. at 21 (concluding that a voter would consider the information at issue 
before casting his vote). 
 178. See supra Part III.D (explaining that under Wisconsin law, informational 
standing would likely allow Ms. Typical to sustain a cause of action). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Not every important idea or entitlement is a legal right.  A legal right 
requires a legal mechanism to articulate it and a process to remedy 
infringements upon the right.179  Informed consent evolved from the 
common law’s recognition that individuals should be the ones that 
determine what happens to their body, and seeking medical treatment is not 
a waiver of the right to be free from trespass.180  As medicine and the law 
became more sophisticated, informed consent changed from battery to a 
form of negligence.181  Physicians gained protection through the 
development of medical malpractice; by decreasing liability exposure, 
medical malpractice empowered doctors to use their judgment, which 
likely brought some benefits to their patients.182 
However, the classification of informed consent as a type of negligence 
weakened the right of bodily integrity by requiring an injury beyond the 
violation of the private right.183  States should apply the doctrine of 
informational standing to informed consent because the denial of 
information circumscribes the right to bodily integrity enough to constitute 
an injury.184  In states like New York, informed consent has become an 
illusory concept with no remedy.185  Even in patient-centered states like 
Washington or Wisconsin, informational standing is necessary to ensure 
plaintiffs can sustain a cause of action for informed consent failures.186  
Liberty requires vigilance in order to preserve or, in some states, take back 
patient autonomy.  Courts and legislatures need to examine their informed 
consent laws to ensure that individuals have a mechanism to assert their 
right to bodily integrity because a right without a remedy is no right at all. 
 
                                                          
 179. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (explaining that a 
right without a remedy is just an idea). 
 180. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 129-30 (N.Y. 1914) 
(articulating that competent adults have an absolute right to be secure in their person). 
 181. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1957) (explaining that the disclosure of treatment information is a sensitive matter 
that requires a physician’s discretion). 
 182. See Halle Fine Terrion, Note, Informed Choice: Physicians’ Duty to Disclose 
Nonreadily Available Alternatives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491, 497-500 (1993) 
(discussing the history and therapeutic belief in medicine regarding patient ignorance). 
 183. See Salgo, 317 P.2d at 178-80 (explaining that medical malpractice decreases 
physicians’ liability exposure). 
 184. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10-12 (Cal. 1972) (discussing how adequate 
disclosure empowers patient autonomy). 
 185. See supra Part III.A (concluding that there is no stand-alone cause of action for 
failure to obtain informed consent under New York law). 
 186. See supra Part III.D (explaining that informational standing provides a 
mechanism for asserting a cause of action because it recognizes the withholding of 
information as an injury). 
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